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A Whole New Ballgame: Coastal Restoration, Storm
Protection, and the Legal Landscape After Katrina
Mark Davis*
Prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, it was already
clear that the collapse of coastal Louisiana, which had seen
roughly 1.5 million acres of coastal wetlands converted to open
water, was not just an environmental problem but a matter vital to
the protection and survival of the region. The storms, which
claimed another 217 square miles of land, put the role of coastal
wetlands and barrier shorelines as vital components of hurricane
defense into stark focus. The physical, cultural, and economic
landscape has been transformed and is now the subject of intense
federal, state, and local efforts to recover from the storms and chart
a new course for the future. Not unexpectedly, the focus of the
recovery planning has been on the physical landscape of the coast.
How much land was lost? Where can levees and wetlands best be
built and maintained? How and where should communities
rebuild?
That focus is understandable and important, but it is
incomplete. There is another dimension, another landscape that
must be dealt with if the full range of recovery opportunities and
constraints is to be understood. I am speaking of the legal
landscape. Quite simply, Louisiana's coastal lands and waters are
not a blank canvas just waiting to be painted with a new generation
of programs and projects. They are largely under the control or
jurisdiction of a number of public and private players who are
charged with operating or managing those resources for certain
specific purposes such as navigation, fresh water supply, fisheries,
oil and gas development, or flood protection. The laws and
policies that drive the management of those coastal resources do
not change or go away simply because new plans and expectations
have arisen. Accordingly, it is as vital to have a firm grip on the
legal landscape that shapes resource management decisions as it is
to understand the ecological and geopolitical landscapes. They are
Copyright 2008, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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all equally real. Just how real and how important is the subject of
this article.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
Coastal Louisiana is a very special place. Formed directly or
indirectly by the Mississippi River over thousands of years, the
nearly four million acres of estuaries, wetlands, and barrier
shorelines that came into the possession of the United States in
1803 have been viewed variously as a wasteland and a treasure.
To be sure, this netherworld between terra firma and water has
been a challenging place to live and work, but it has also been an
area of central importance to our nation's strategic, commercial,
cultural, and ecologic interests. It is no stretch to say that
geographer Peirce Lewis' description of New Orleans as a place
that was "impossible but inevitable"' could apply to many of the
human activities in coastal Louisiana as a whole. But coping with
the challenges presented by America's greatest river and a
naturally dynamic coast was not just a matter of science and
engineering; it required a framework, a legal framework, to set it
all in motion. Indeed, the very founding of New Orleans was an
act intended to support France's legal claim of sovereignty over the
Mississippi River and much of the central portion of what was to
Since then, virtually all of the
become the United States.
management or mismanagement of the waters and wetlands of this
region has occurred under the color of law, both state and federal.
Those laws have governed the ownership, use, and management of
our lands and waters and in the process have shaped the Louisiana
we have inherited. It is no less true that they will now, just as
surely, either enable or constrain the plans being drawn for the
future.
Some of these laws are obvious, such as those that define
public and private property rights, mandate environmental
protection, or that authorize the specific undertakings like levees or
navigation projects. Some are less obvious, such as those that
control the duties and purposes of institutional actors, for instance,
1. CRAIG E. COLTEN, AN UNNATURAL METROPOLIS: WRESTING NEW
ORLEANS FROM NATURE 2 (2005).
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government agencies or private corporations. Whatever the case
may be, it has been a legal regime that has driven and controlled
the engineering, use, and exploitation of our coastal resources in
the past, and that will continue to be the case in the future. As
obvious as that last point may be to lawyers, it has been anything
but in the realm of coastal restoration planning and hurricane
protection. It has repeatedly been the case that the importance of
understanding the legal side of coastal stewardship and storm
protection has been recalled only after trouble was already at hand.
Unfortunately, law has been the junior partner of science,
engineering, and politics when it has come to planning for the
effective stewardship of Louisiana's coast and the protection of its
communities. To be sure, there have been notable exceptions, such
as the limited authorization of the state to negotiate the ownership
of minerals on reclaimed coastal lands 2 and the constitutional
amendments conforming Louisiana takings law with federal law
for the purposes of coastal restoration and storm protection. 3 By
and large those exceptions prove the rule though, since they were
all catalyzed by some significant event, such as an enormous
judgment against the state or the prospect of litigation.4 As
understandable as that may be in any specific case, the overall
effect has been that state and federal laws (and their attendant
policies) have done more to constrain-rather than facilitateeffective coastal conservation and restoration and hurricane
protection efforts. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita provided the final
proof of such constraint.
In many ways this comes as no surprise. After all, there is an
inherent conservatism in the law that by design is intended to
regulate the activities and relationships of society in a predictable
and orderly fashion over time. Add to that the fact that most of the
people working to plan and carry out the state and federal coastal
conservation, restoration, and flood protection efforts are working
for institutions with prescribed missions, authorizations, and
budgets and whose job it is to "follow the law." It becomes easy to
2. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:1702(D)(2)(a)(i) (2007).
3. See LA. CONST. art. VI, § 42; LA. CONST. art I, § 4(G).
4. See, e.g., State v. St. Charles Airline Lands, Inc., 871 So. 2d 674 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 2004).
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see how the law, unlike science and engineering, comes to be seen
as largely immutable-something that is just there. In calmer
times that may be fine, but in times of trial, like these, one finds
that laws do not always define the public interest and, indeed, can
frustrate it.
An example of this frustration is the case of the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet (MRGO). The MRGO is a federal navigation
channel that was dug through the swamps and marshes southeast of
New Orleans to afford a shorter route for maritime traffic servicing
the Port of New Orleans. Unfortunately, the benefits touted for the
project largely failed to materialize, while the negative impacts of
the project, wetlands loss, and the exposure to storm damage were
delivered in spades. For years a growing chorus of voices called
for the closure of the channel and the rehabilitation of the
landscape. A substantial amount of time, energy, and money was
spent discussing the science and engineering closure options, yet
nothing happened.
Even after Hurricane Katrina, to the
astonishment of many, the Corps of Engineers continued to assume
the MRGO would continue to be a feature of the landscape.
There was actually a very good reason for that assumption.
The MRGO would remain a feature of the physical landscape
because it was a feature of the legal landscape. Congress had told
the Corps to construct and maintain the channel, and as long as it
was legally authorized, it was its duty to plan around. It was not a
question of science, engineering, public preference, or even good
sense. It was a matter of law. Until that was understood and
addressed, those asking the Corps to contemplate a future without
the MRGO were asking it to do something it did not believe it
could do legally. That linkage was finally made by the Governor's
Advisory Commission on Coastal Protection, Restoration, and
Conservation, which ultimately led to Congress directing the Corps
to develop a closure plan for the MRGO. 5
The MRGO is not an isolated situation. Increasingly, the ease
or difficulty of saving Louisiana's coast and protecting its
communities will turn on just how tailored our laws are to making
our best plans affordably implementable.
5.

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON

TERROR AND HURRICANE RECOVERY,

H.R. Rep. No. 109-234 (2006).

2008]

A WHOLE NEWBALLGAME

423

To some degree, the state has begun to recognize this need.
Since the storms of 2005, the state has moved to integrate its
coastal conservation and restoration efforts with its storm and
flood protection efforts. 6 It has also moved to consolidate, to a
greater extent, local levee boards in the greater New Orleans area.
Indeed, the state's recently completed Comprehensive Master Plan
for a Sustainable Coast (April, 2007) 7 explicitly recognizes that the
future of the state as a cultural, economic, and ecologic entity
depends on the integration of structural flood protection, wetland
and barrier shoreline restoration, and nonstructural measures such
as land use controls. The Master Plan and the corresponding
federal effort led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are laying
the foundation for a vast public works and resource conservation
effort with a price tag in the tens of billions of dollars. There will
be three main aspects to those efforts: (1) structural flood
protection, (2) wetland and barrier island restoration, and (3)
nonstructural flood protection.
The first two categories will involve public works on a large
scale. They will also take years to authorize, design, and build.
The third category, nonstructural protection, has garnered much
less attention but can make an appreciable difference in the short
run. This category covers such measures as land use controls,
building codes, wetland conservation, public education, and
evacuation planning.
None of these categories of action is completely distinct. They
can and are intended to work together to produce a more
comprehensive suite of public benefits. They will also confront
three critical, and related, legal issues: (1) property ownership, (2)
land use, and (3) takings.
The manner in which those issues are dealt with may well
determine the level of success of the state and federal efforts to
restore and revitalize the coast and its communities.

6.

See generally 2005 La. Acts No. 8.

7. COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH. OF LA., INTEGRATED
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION AND HURRICANE PROTECTION:
LOUISIANA'S
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST (2007) [hereinafter
MASTER PLAN].
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A. Property Ownership
The ownership of land in coastal Louisiana has always been a
bit problematic. In geologic terms, the area is less a place than a
process, a process of land building and retreat that defies our
normal notions of land as a solid, permanent thing. The definitions
of and boundaries between what is private and what is public are
not precise and can be altered. Despite years of effort by
Louisiana courts and lawmakers to provide greater clarity, the
simple fact of the matter is that, in practice, a degree of uncertainty
is the order of the day.8 This has not been helped by the fact that,
for years, the state did not attempt to identify or assert its
ownership claims in any coherent manner.
It was on that chaotic landscape that Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita made landfall. With over two hundred square miles of land
being converted to open water and the need to urgently begin
coastal restoration and hurricane protection efforts on a vast scale,
the question of who owns what will have to be dealt with much
more forthrightly. At least in the case of coastal restoration
projects, the state's practice has been to handle real estate issues on
a project-by-project basis and then, generally, only after a project
is at or near the point where it is authorized for construction. That
approach may have worked for the more modestly paced and
scaled effort that preceded Katrina but it will almost certainly
guarantee the delay, increased cost, and perhaps even failure of the
work needed after Katrina as envisioned by the state's Master Plan.
Even if the state takes on this challenge it will be no easy task
for two reasons. First, the coast itself is dynamic: what is land
today may be open "navigable" water tomorrow and what is water
today may become land. Second, whatever precision may appear
to exist in the printed text of a statute tends to dissolve when
applied to our coastal landscape. Terms such as navigable, inland
waters, seashore, and arm-of-the-sea tend to lose their meaning in a
collapsing landscape and in areas of induced land building such as
the Atchafalaya Delta.
The general rules governing land
ownership in Louisiana are well known and have been discussed at

8.

See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1115.1-.3 (2007).
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length before. 9 It is applying those rules to a coherent effect that is
the challenge. Coastal lands generally fall into one of the
following four categories-public lands, private lands, public lands
burdened by a private right, or private lands subject to some public
use.

* Public lands are those owned outright by the state or some
other governmental area and areas such as navigable water
bottoms.
* Public lands burdened by a private right would include
state lands that are subject to an affirmative private property
interest, such as a lease, or an inchoate private right, like the
right to reclaim eroded lands.
* Private lands subject to public use include areas burdened
by public leases and servitudes. These public rights can be
created by contract, gift, or by operation of law, as is the case
with river banks (including land built by alluvion or
dereliction).
* Private lands are lands owned by private parties that do not
fit into any of the previous categories.
The classification of a given tract of land can make a big
difference when it comes to planning for the future of the coast. It
matters in terms of who is entitled to use and access those lands. It
matters in terms of the time and expense that coastal restoration
and storm protection planners must anticipate in regard to
acquiring the rights necessary to plan, construct, operate, and
maintain the vast array of projects now being contemplated. It
matters in terms of tax rolls and liability. And it matters in terms
of who has rights to the revenues from those lands and the minerals
beneath them.
By way of illustration, consider the coastal restoration plans
devised by the state and the Army Corps of Engineers before
Katrina and Rita. The cost of a "near term" plan for restoring the
coast was set at around $1.9 billion. Of that amount, nearly $387
million, or roughly twenty percent, was related to securing land-

9. See, e.g., Judith Perhay, Louisiana CoastalRestoration: Challenges and
Controversies, 27 S.U. L. REV. 149 (1999); Marc Hebert, Coastal Restoration
Under CWPPRA andPropertyRights Issues, 57 LA. L. REV. 1165 (1997).
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rights.' ° It would also be the responsibility of the non-federal
partner-in this case the state of Louisiana-to secure those rights.
That is no small undertaking.
All of this begs for a robust, forward-looking approach to
identifying the lands, waters, and water-bottoms to which the state
and its political subdivisions have rights and for acquiring
whatever additional rights they need. This is a very different scale
and focus than has been characteristic of state efforts in the past.
The Louisiana State Land Office was struggling to keep pace with
these issues of ownership and access even before Katrina and Rita,
a fact recognized by the Louisiana legislature in 2004. At that time
the legislature declared that "proper identification and inventory of
water-bottoms, and their boundaries and title, is urgent and critical
to all citizens of the state of Louisiana" and directed the State Land
Office to complete an inventory of water-bottoms within four
years." What was urgent before the storms of 2005 is even more
so and more difficult now. It is vital that the state provide the
direction and resources necessary to complete and regularly update
that inventory. To be sure, it will not solve all of the problems in
this realm but it will go a long way toward providing greater clarity
about just what rights the state has and what it may yet need to
acquire.
B. Land Use
Land use patterns in Louisiana have been shaped by a number
of social and economic factors over the years. Residential
development, industrial siting, and transportation infrastructure,
such as highways, bridges, and canals, all too often took root
without any apparent recognition of how those things might affect
one another, the environment, or the well-being of the broader
public. In short, land use planning and land use were not
necessarily related concepts. Katrina and Rita made clear that
there is a price for that approach to development; just how clear
can be seen by evaluating the New Orleans metropolitan area.
10. 1 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, LOUISIANA COASTAL AREA (LCA),
LOUISIANA ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION STUDY: MAIN REPORT, at MR 4-57
(2004).

11.

See S. Con. Res. 25, Reg. Sess. (La. 2004).
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In 1960, prior to Hurricane Betsy, desegregation, and the
opening of the MRGO, the population of New Orleans was2
627,585 with an average density of 3,157 people per square mile.'
By 2000, those figures had dropped to 484,674 and a density of
2,677 people per square mile.' 3 At the same time the surrounding
parishes were gaining population. Clearly, there was a spreading
of the population from New Orleans to outlying areas. Whatever
the reasons for that might have been, one clear result was the need
to cast the hurricane protection net wider, at least on the south
shore of Lake Pontchartrain.14 Unfortunately, the resource base for
planning and constructing those facilities did not expand in pace
with the population. This contributed to flood protection being
divided among a plethora of federal, state, and local entities with
the lamentable result of a lower level, and evidently lower quality,
of protection for a large but dispersed population, instead of a
higher level of protection for more concentrated communities.
One of the most encouraging features of the state Master Plan
is its recognition of the need to make land use planning, building
codes, and evacuation planning central features of the state's
integrated approach to protecting lives, communities, and the
culture of the region. The plan makes a number of references to
sustainable
the need to prevent development in wetland area, foster
5
controls.'
use
land
enforce
strictly
and
coastal forests,
As strong as this language is, it is largely aspirational and
dependent on local governments to enact and "strictly enforce"
Given that many local
land use and zoning regulations.' 6
governments lack any meaningful land use planning authority or
the resources to more aggressively pursue planning and
12. Campbell Gibson, Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other
Urban Places in the United States: 1770 to 1990 tbl.19 (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Population Division Working Paper No. 27, 1998), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027.html (follow
"19." hyperlink).
13. U.S. Census Bureau, State and Country QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/22/22071 .html (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
14. The reasons for the exclusion of St. Tammany Parish from that
protection are beyond the scope of this article.
15. MASTER PLAN, supra note 7, at 32, 53, 59, 78, 80-81.
16. Id. at 53.
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enforcement, it is essential for the state to take stock of that fact
and develop specific actions to address it. Presently, the plan calls
for the state to provide incentives to local governments to enact
region-wide land use zoning but does not indicate what those
might be or what the state will consider doing if the incentives are
not sufficient. The state currently has laws to enable local
planning and zoning but they do not mandate it nor do they provide
any guidance as to what the elements of a local plan might be. 17 If
the state wants effective land use planning and zoning to be the
basis for preventing future development in harm's way or in areas
to be affected by some of the large-scale hurricane protection or
coastal restoration projects envisioned by the Master Plan, then
much more will be needed.
Another major land use issue that will almost certainly take on
greater importance is that of what role the state and federal
governments can and should play in preventing inappropriate
development and in conserving the state's wetland resources. Both
the state and the federal governments have regulatory programs
that are supposed to restrict development in areas that are
jurisdictionally "wet." The main programs on the state level are
the Coastal Management Program administered by the Department
of Natural Resources and the Department of Environmental
Quality's water quality certification program.' s On the federal
side, the dominant regulatory programs are those sanctioned by
section 404 of the Clean Water Act and section 10 of the River and
Harbors Act of 1899. Both programs are administered by the
Army Corps of Engineers.
Surprisingly, these regulatory functions have not received
much attention in the state and federal efforts to plan for the future
safety and sustainability of the coast. The Master Plan has only
one reference to the state's Coastal Zone Management Program,
19
necessary
as
the program.
where
it calls
for strengthening
program
should
be, there
is no discussion
of what that As
that might
17. See, e.g., Stephen D. Villavaso, Planning Enabling Legislation in
Louisiana:A Retrospective Analysis, 45 LOY. L. REv. 655 (1999).
18. Both of these programs have their roots in federal law: the Coastal Zone
Management Act in the case of the Coastal Management Program, and section
401 of the Clean Water Act in the case of water quality certification.
19. See MASTER PLAN, supra note 7, at 78.
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be doing now or what improvements might be needed. Surely, the
state must have some idea of how both the current and improved
programs might help achieve the Master Plan's objectives.
The Army Corps of Engineers' preliminary Louisiana Coastal
Protection and Restoration report was even quieter.
The Corps
has recognized the need to restrict development in wetland areas
and has noted the importance of such "nonstructural" measures as
local zoning, building codes and land acquisition, evacuation
planning, and education in reducing storm risk.2 1 Notably missing
from that list is its regulatory authority under the Clean Water Act
and the River and Harbors Act.
If ever there was a time for the coordinated application of the
Corps' and the state's regulatory functions, one would think that
this is it. For years that function has been lacking a clear purpose
and the resources necessary to be robustly and professionally
conducted. If properly managed and integrated, those existing
regulatory authorities could be used to protect the public interest,
reduce the risk to life and property, reduce the risk of exposure to
takings claims by helping to define a purposeful public interest and
shape private investment expectations, and ultimately make the
cost of coastal protection and restoration more affordable in terms
of time and money.
These are not abstract points. Applications continue to be filed
with the state and the Corps for projects that would convert coastal
wetlands to other uses and increase the number of people and
homes and businesses in areas still lacking significant storm
protection. The manner in which such cases are handled will be
illuminating as to the ability and willingness of federal, state, and
local government to implement what seems to be a bedrock tenet
of the state Master Plan.
The importance of using existing authorities and identifying
what more is needed goes beyond the issue of discouraging "at
risk" development or conserving wetlands. It goes to the state's
bottom line. It has been made clear in recent jurisprudence that the
20. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, LOUISIANA COASTAL PROTECTION
AND RESTORATION PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL REPORT TO UNITED STATES
CONGRESS (2006).
21.

Id. at 38-39.
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record of the Department of Natural Resources and the Army
Corps of Engineers of approving nearly all permit requests for
development in coastal waters and wetlands has been a factor in
rulings against the state and local levee districts in takings cases
connected with the provision of vital public services such as
hurricane protection.
Additionally, continued development of
wetland areas, particularly in light of the uncertain and checkered
experience with mitigation, could have a direct impact on the
state's cost sharing burdens under the Coastal Wetlands, Planning,
Protection, and Restoration Act (CWPPRA). The state's cost
sharing percentage dropped from twenty-five percent to fifteen
percent under CWPPRA as a result of the Conservation Plan, the
purpose of which is to ensure that there is no net loss of wetlands
in the state's coastal zone due to development. The ability to
effectively regulate such development is directly tied to the state's
pocketbook.
C. Takings
Given the scale of the landscape in play in the Master Plan,
roughly three million acres, and the scale of the projects and
programs that will be needed to restore some sense of functional
stability to the region, it is easy to see how daunting the prospect is
of dealing with takings claims at that scale. This is all the more
daunting because the state has largely dealt with the takings issue
in this realm by seeking to avoid rather than to understand and
manage it. Further, because Louisiana law had been more
restrictive of government action than federal law, the immediate
impact of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Lucas v.
South CarolinaCoastal Council2 3 was less dramatic until recently.
Accordingly, Louisiana is dealing with these issues not only
through the lens of Lucas and its own constitution and
jurisprudence but also in the context of the need for urgent action
to facilitate the very survival of the region.

22. See State v. St. Charles Airline Lands, Inc., 871 So. 2d 674, 683-84 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 2004).
23. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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In Louisiana, as in all states, the relationship between
government and private property is complex. It is simultaneously
symbiotic and adversarial. On the one hand government defines,
creates, protects, and even encourages private property rights. On
the other hand, government often must limit, curtail, infringe, or
extinguish private rights in the conduct of its essential public
purposes.
The dual nature of this relationship inevitably leads to tension
and cases of confusion and conflict. That is particularly true when
the role and scope of governmental action are changing: in other
words, in times like these. Though it is probably impossible to
eliminate the potential for conflict, good planning and a sound
understanding of the applicable laws can go a long way to reducing
both the frequency and severity of any conflicts. Any effort to
revamp or expand land use planning law and practice in Louisiana
should be approached with that firmly in mind.
The prohibition against governmental takings is rooted in both
the Federal and State Constitutions. The Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides that: "No person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public purpose, without just
compensation."
The Louisiana constitution states, in pertinent part:
Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use,
enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right
is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the
reasonable exercise of the police power.
Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its
political subdivisions except for public purposes and with
just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his
benefit....
In every expropriation or action to take property pursuant
to the provisions of this Section . . . the owner shall be
compensated to the full extent of his loss. Except as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the full extent of
the loss shall include, but not be limited to, the appraised
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value of the property and all costs of relocation,
inconvenience, and any other damages 24
actually incurred by
expropriation.
the
of
because
the owner
The latter provision makes three things very clear. First, there
is an affirmative right to own property. Second, property owners
are entitled to compensation if their property is taken or damaged
by the state or its political subdivisions. And third, the right to
own property is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and
exercises of police powers.
Generally speaking there are two types of actionable takingsthose that involve the physical dispossession of the private
property owner and those that so reduce the value and use of the
property as to constructively constitute dispossession. This latter
class of takings is referred to as "regulatory takings," "inverse
condemnation," or (at least in Louisiana in certain circumstances)
"appropriation. 25 This is the category of takings that arises from
24. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
25. Though it might not be clear from the language of section 4, the
jurisprudence leaves no doubt that in cases where governmental bodies take or
damage private property without first exercising eminent domain, they can be
sued to recover for that taking.
Such situations are called "inverse
condemnation" or "appropriation," to distinguish them from direct expropriation
via eminent domain. It is this aspect of the law that often comes into play when
zoning or other governmental land use controls are put to use.
The authority of government (and certain corporations and limited liability
companies) to take or expropriate property is implicit in the Louisiana
Constitution, LA. CONST. art. I, § 4, and explicit in the Louisiana Revised
Statutes, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19:2 (2007). Specific procedures are set forth
for exercising that authority. § 19:2.2; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:441-42
(2007). Because there are instances in which public bodies in fact take or
damage private property without having first gone through an expropriation
proceeding, the courts have created the concept of inverse condemnation to
ensure that there is some proceeding available for the affected property owner to
seek redress. See State Through the Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Chambers Inv.
Co., 595 So. 2d 598, 602 (La. 1992); Reymond v. State Through the Dep't. of
Highways, 231 So. 2d 375, 383 (La. 1970), overruling recognized by Ursin v.
New Orleans Aviation Bd., 506 So. 2d 947 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987); Roy v.
Belt, 868 So. 2d 209, 214 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004).
Despite the fact that inverse condemnation is not defined or expressly
provided for in either the Civil Code or the Louisiana Revised Statutes, it is
clear that the right of action is not a mere judicial construction. Rather,
Louisiana courts have recognized that the action for inverse condemnation is an
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land use controls and regulation of the sort discussed here. For
convenience we refer to these as "regulatory takings" for the
purpose of this discussion.
Though Federal Fifth Amendment jurisprudence has been
instructive to Louisiana takings jurisprudence generally, regulatory
takings under Louisiana law have been governed by the distinctive
standards of the Louisiana Constitution that control land use and
regulatory actions by the state and its political subdivisions. At
least that has been the case until recently. In 2003 and 2006
Louisiana amended article I, section 4 of its constitution and
passed attendant legislation to provide that in the case of property
rights "affected by coastal wetlands conservation, management,
preservation, creation, or restoration" or "lands and improvements
actually used or destroyed in the construction, enlargement,
improvement, or modification of federal or non-federal hurricane
protection projects, including mitigation related thereto" that
compensation shall not exceed that required under the Fifth
Amendment. 26

attribute of the self-executing nature of the Louisiana Constitution's requirement
that the government pay just compensation when it takes or damages private
property. See Chambers, 595 So. 2d at 602; St. Tammany Parish Hosp. Serv.
Dist. No. 2 v. Schneider, 808 So. 2d 576, 582 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2001). It is also
clear that the elements of an inverse condemnation (or appropriation) case are
the same as those in an expropriation case. These are:
* A recognized species of property right must have been affected,
* The property right must have been taken or damaged in a constitutional
sense, and
* The taking or damaging must be incidental to acts by the public body in
pursuit of a public purpose.
See Chambers, 595 So. 2d at 603; Holzenthal v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New
Orleans, 950 So. 2d 55, 63 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2007.), writ denied, 953 So. 2d 71
(La. 2007).
26. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(F)-(G); LA. CONST. art. VI, § 42; LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 49:213.10 (2007). Though the effect of these changes is largely
the same, they are not identically created. The requirement that compensation
arising in the hurricane protection levees "not exceed the compensation required
by the Fifth Amendment" is made explicit in Louisiana Constitution article VI,
section 42 and Louisiana Constitution article I, section 4(G). The compensation
limits for coastal restoration, etc., are enabled by Louisiana Constitution article
I, section 4(F) but spelled out in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:213.10,
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Since it is clear that a regulatory land use program can trigger
compensable takings,27 the key questions become (1) if and when a
given program effects a compensable taking and (2) what is the
amount of compensation due?
II. WHAT IS AN ACTIONABLE REGULATORY TAKING?

The question of just what constitutes a regulatory taking is less
precise than most might expect. The entire concept of regulatory
takings only dates back to 1922 in Justice Holmes's opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.28 In recapping the legal history
of regulatory takings in his majority opinion in Lucas, Justice
Scalia candidly noted that "we have generally eschewed any 'set
to 'engag[e]
formula' for determining how far is too far, 2preferring
9
in ...essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.'
The fact that Louisiana has, at least since 1974, had a very
different definition of what is a taking does not make things any
easier. Because Louisiana now follows its traditional takings laws
in some situations and the federal approach in others, it is
important to have a basic understanding of both, including how
and when they will be applied.
A. Regulatory Takings Under LouisianaLaw
Louisiana follows the modem rule that the law protects the
right to use and enjoy a thing or land, not just the physical sanctity
of the object itself Put another way, the legal term "property"
refers not just to an object but to the rights that exist with respect to
the object.3° When a substantial interference is imposed upon the
free use and enjoyment of property, a compensable taking may
arise under Louisiana law regardless of whether expropriation

which provides "[c]ompensation ...shall be governed by and strictly limited to
the amount and circumstances required by the Fifth Amendment."
27. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
28. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
29. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
30. Chambers, 595 So. 2d at 601.
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proceedings have been initiated, as in the regulatory takings
context. 3 ' It is clear that regulatory land use actions such as zoning
or rezoning may result in a taking. 32 It is also clear that a
compensable taking does not occur merely because a property
owner is unable to develop his property to its maximum economic
potential.33 Whether a taking has occurred in a given case depends
on three factors: First, is a legally recognized private property right
affected? Second, has that property right been taken or damaged?
Third, was the taking or damaging for a public purpose? All three
factors must be met for a compensable taking or damaging to have
occurred.34
The first prong of this three part test requires a showing of
some legal status that runs with the property. 35 This can be an
ownership interest, a leasehold, or a servitude; however, a mere
user or possessor of property may not bring an inverse
condemnation claim. 36 Under federal law there is a requirement
that the property interest be supported by a "distinct investmentbacked expectation[]," but that is generally not the case under
Louisiana law. 37 This can lead to, and has in the past led to,
takings cases proceeding under Louisiana law that would not be
allowed under federal law. 38 That disparity is one of the reasons
for the recent changes to the Louisiana Constitution to bring
Louisiana and federal takings law into harmony for hurricane
31. Id. at 602.
32. See Standard Materials, Inc. v. City of Slidell, 700 So. 2d 975, 984 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1997); Layne v. City of Mandeville (Layne 1), 633 So. 2d 608, 610
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 234 (La. 1994), aff'd, 743 So.
2d 1263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999), writ denied, 754 So. 2d 966 (La. 2000).
33. See Standard Materials, 700 So. 2d at 984 (citing Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)); State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. City of New
Orleans, 676 So. 2d 149, 154 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
34. Chambers, 595 So. 2d at 603.
35. Layne v. City of Mandeville, 743 So. 2d 1263, 1268 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1999).
36. Id.
37. Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
105 (1978), with Avenal v. Louisiana (Avenal 1), 757 So. 2d 1, 6 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1999) (citing La. Seafood Mgmt. v. La. Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n, 715
So. 2d 387, 393 (La. 1998)).
38. AvenalI, 757 So. 2d at 6.
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protection and coastal conservation and restoration projects,
likely to be partnered with the federal
projects increasingly
39
government.
The second prong is a question of fact based on whether the
governmental act "destroyed a major portion of the property's40
value or eliminated the practical economic uses of the property.
The third prong is also fact-dependent, but jurisprudence indicates
that actions taken to reduce flooding risk are "manifestly evident"
of a valid public purpose. 4 1 Though Holzenthal involved a
drainage project, there seems little doubt that regulatory actions
taken to avoid or abate flooding or other risks would be no less
evident as a public purpose. This conclusion is supported by the
well-established principal that the authority to zone flows from the
government's police power and that there is a presumption that
zoning ordinances are valid.42 Given the statements made in the
state Coastal Master Plan about the importance of land use
planning and non-structural approaches to managing risk in coastal
Louisiana, it seems clear that the enhanced use of zoning and
similar development controls under the Coastal Zone Management
for the purpose of safeguarding life and property and in facilitating
coastal landscape would be
the conservation and restoration of the
43
purpose.
public
a manifestly evident
B. Regulatory Takings Under FederalLaw
Two discrete categories of regulatory takings have been
recognized that give rise to a categorical obligation to compensate
without requiring any specific factual inquiries about the particular
39. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(F)-(G); LA. CONST. art. VI, § 42; see also LA.
REv.STAT. ANN. § 49:213.10 (2007).
40. Layne v. City of Mandeville (Layne 1), 633 So. 2d 608, 612 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1993) (citing Lakeshore Harbor Condo. Dev. v. New Orleans, 603 So.
2d 192 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992)), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 234 (La. 1994), aff'd,
743 So. 2d 1263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999), writ denied, 754 So. 2d 966 (La.
2000).
41. Holzenthal v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 950 So. 2d 55, 66
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 953 So. 2d 71 (La. 2007).
42. Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n of Calcasieu Parish, 561 So. 2d
482, 491 (La. 1990).
43. See, e.g., MASTER PLAN, supra note 7, at 68, 105.
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case. The first is regulations that require a landowner to suffer a
permanent "physical invasion." 44 The second is regulations that
deny all economically beneficial or productive use of the land. 45 It
is this second category of takings that comes into play in the
context of land use and hazard mitigation regulations of the sort
discussed in this report. Understanding the scope and bounds of
federal takings law has taken on a sense of urgency and importance
since the adoption of the federal standard for hurricane protection
and coastal restoration and conservation projects. The basic
elements of a regulatory takings claim under federal law are well
established, if not entirely clear.
The third category involves situations in which some, but not
all, of the beneficial or productive use of the land is denied. In
such cases, compensation may be due based upon a balancing of
the public interest involved, the economic impact of the regulation
on the property owner, and the extent to which the regulation
interferes with the property owner's investment-backed
expectations. 46 Generally speaking, the sort of land use measures
we are considering would fall under either the second or third
categories of claims. Despite the apparent clarity of these rules,
they are anything but precise in their application. 47 Questions
about the nature and extent of the property interest at issue
continue to arise, as does the source and nature of the "police
power" being asserted through land use regulation. Even under
Lucas' first two categories, compensation may not be due if the
property interest at stake is subject to a traditional public interest
constraint such as nuisance law or the need to protect public
welfare as a matter of necessity. 48 In short, in such cases there is
44. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1016, 1019. See also Layne v. City of Mandeville (Layne 1), 633
So. 2d 608, 611 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 234 (La.
1994), aff'd, 743 So. 2d 1263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999), writ denied, 754 So. 2d
966 (La. 2000).
47. The majority opinion in Lucas admitted as much. In a footnote, Justice
Scalia noted that "[r]egrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all
economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision" and that
"[u]nsurprisingly, this uncertainty... has produced inconsistent pronouncements
by the Court." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
48. Id. at 1024, 1028.
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no abridgment of a private property right because the government
reserved the right to act in those cases when the private property
right was created.
As confusing as that may be, it actually fits well with some
longstanding principles of Louisiana law. As noted above, article
I, section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution expressly states that
private property rights are not absolute but subject to reasonable
exercises of police power and statutory restrictions. 49 Further, the
notion that some property rights have been reserved by the state, at
least in some situations, is fully consistent with the state's doctrine
of appropriation, which has been explained as "the exercise of a
pre-existing but previously unexercised public right." 50 It was that
doctrine that historically allowed the construction of levees along
the Mississippi River without any duty to compensate
landowners. 51 In coastal Louisiana the application of hazard
mitigation driven zoning laws would fall largely on the wetter
regions of the coast-its swamps and marshes. In that context, the
potential for triggering compensable takings claims seems very
limited for three reasons. First, it seems doubtful that such rules
would result in a complete denial of the economic uses of the land.
Since most of these areas are not readily amenable to residential or
commercial development without extensive levee building and
drainage, their economic value has been rooted more in hunting,
fishing, timbering, mineral extraction, and eco-tourism, all of
which are activities that, within certain boundaries, would still be
pursuable.
Second, most of this area is already pervasively regulated
under the Clean Water Act, the River and Harbors Act of 1899,
and the Coastal Zone Management Act, so the degree to which
there is a reasonable investment-backed development expectation
seems very limited.
Finally, there is a strong case that the importance of reducing
risk exposure and restoring the coast has become a matter of such

49.

See supra Part I.C.

50. Vela v. Plaquemines Parish Gov't (Vela 1), 811 So. 2d 1263, 1268 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Vela v. Plaquemines Parish Gov't (Vela II), 729
So. 2d 178, 181 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999)).
51. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896).
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pressing urgency that hazard mitigation driven land use controls
are a matter of public necessity under the state's police power.
This was addressed in Avenal v. State (Avenal 111)52 by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in response to a claim that the operation
of the Caernarvon coastal restoration project had resulted in a
taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The
court dispensed with that claim, noting that even if the project "did
entirely deprive them of all economically beneficial and productive
use of their property rights, the plaintiffs are still not entitled to
compensation as Caernarvon was a valid exercise of the state's
police power underfederal law."53 In the context of the state and
federal efforts to develop comprehensive programs to restore the
coast and protect lives, property and vital infrastructure, and
programs that emphasize land use controls, there seems to be no
basis for distinguishing between a river reintroduction project and
land use controls that are part and parcel of the same program.
III. How MUCH COMPENSATION Is DUE?

Assuming that a land use regulation has caused a taking, the
question becomes how much compensation is due. The answer to
this question depends on whether Louisiana is applying its general
takings law or federal law to the facts of each case. The difference
can be significant.
In general, federal law requires only "just compensation" be
paid, which has come to mean the fair market value of the "taken"
property right.
Louisiana law is different and has changed over time.
Presently, Louisiana law provides not only for "just compensation"
but also for the affected property owner to be compensated "to the
full extent of his loSS." '5
As noted earlier, the Louisiana
Constitution makes it clear that this is more than just the fair
market value of the property. 55 It also includes all costs of
relocation, inconvenience, and any other damages actually
incurred. This clearly goes beyond what is required by the Federal
52.
53.
54.
55.

886 So. 2d 1085, 1107-08 n.28 (La. 2004).
Id. (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (emphasis added)).
LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(5).
See supra Part I.C.
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Constitution and even beyond what would be recoverable under
Louisiana tort law.56
Whether land use controls will be judged under the federal
standard or the general Louisiana standard really depends on
whether they are found to be an integral part of the state's
hurricane protection efforts or its coastal wetlands conservation,
management, preservation, creation, or restoration program. If
either of these applies, then the federal standard would apply
through the application of Louisiana Constitution article I, sections
4(F) and (G), article VI, section 42, and Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 49:213.10. Given the state's priorities of reducing risk to
life and property in its coastal region and preserving and restoring
its coastal environment as set forth in the state's Master Plan,
which was adopted unanimously by the legislature, it would seem
a very strong case exists for finding that hazard mitigation focused
land use regulations are to be analyzed under the federal standard.
It would also seem that a strong case could be made in some
instances that the need for such regulation is a matter of public
necessity so as to obviate the need for compensation regardless of
which standard is applied. Of course, the facts of each case will be
largely determinative.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Coastal protection and restoration have been the subject of
growing interest over the past decade. Plans, projects, and
programs have been initiated at the local, state, and federal levels
that, if implemented, would reshape our coast and provide
increased levels of storm protection for many of our coastal
communities. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita cast the importance of
saving our coast and improving storm protection in a new and
more urgent light.
Since the storms, the Louisiana and federal governments have
charged teams of scientists, engineers, and others with developing
56. See State Through the Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Chambers Inv. Co.,
595 So. 2d 598, 602 (La. 1992) for a discussion of this shifting standard and the
intention of the framers of the 1974 Constitution to increase the level and scope
of compensation in takings cases. See also Standard Materials, Inc. v. City of
Slidell, 700 So. 2d 975, 984 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997).
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bolder, more comprehensive plans that would both save our coast
and provide unprecedented levels of storm protection. The level of
effort has been remarkable, even heroic, but it has been focused
almost exclusively on the physical and geopolitical landscapes.
Unless the legal landscape is more effectively integrated into our
coastal planning, it is almost certain that success will be harder and
more costly to achieve. Issues of ownership, access, land use
regulation, compensation, and even those governing the
authorization and funding of projects will be difficult to resolve,
but ignoring or deferring them will not make things any easier.
Katrina and Rita have provided one thing that should make this
challenging task a bit less difficult, however, and that is a clear and
compelling public interest.
With the very survival of our
communities, culture, and the land beneath our feet at stake, it
should be the object of our local, state, and federal governments to
apply-or change--our laws to give our citizens, communities,
and our coast a fighting chance at a vibrant future. It is a whole
new ballgame and our odds of winning depend in large measure on
how well we understand, apply, and are served by the laws that
make up the legal landscape of our coast.

